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Introduction 
As Feldman (1988) mentioned, creative expression is a 
rare phenomenon resulting from demanding co-incidence. 
Creativity requires several factors to act at the same 
time, both in the individual who creates and in his or her 
surrounding environment. Therefore, creativity corresponds 
to the manifestation of a complex interaction of factors, and 
such complexity causes difficulties in efforts to understand 
this phenomenon while taking any partial approach (Lubart 
& Guignard, 2004; Simonton, 2004). However, there is still 
a great deal of exploration to be done regarding various 
aspects of creativity and the way they can be combined in 
some compound form (Csikszentmihalyi, 1999; Sternberg 
& Lubart, 1995, 1996). One way to overcome the limits 
of studies on creativity is to use a wide range of methods 
and evaluation instruments (El-Murad & West, 2004). Yet 
assessment of creativity is regarded to be an extremely 
difficult and vehement topic, particularly if psychometric 
instruments are used (Baer, 1994; Kaufman & Sternberg, 
2006). 
In order to overcome such difficulties, some authors 
suggest assessing creativity through creative products. This 
form of assessment provides greater ecological validity 
and allows increasing the reliability of measurement, 
which may be quite low in the case of simpler measures 
of creative potential (Amabile, 1996; Baer, Kaufman, & 
Gentile, 2004; Runco & Charles, 1997). Such an approach 
is also adopted in this study. 
According to the well-known 4P approach (Rhodes, 
1961; Richards, 1999; Runco, 2004), the phenomenon 
of creativity can be analyzed from four perspectives, 
which pertain to Creative Process, Creative Person, 
Creative Product, or Social Press. In this paper, we focus 
on the cognitive dimension of creativity. It means that 
we understand creativity as a particular form of problem 
solving, and aim at identification of cognitive processes 
that are able to mediate between the characteristics of a 
person and his or her productions (Lubart & Mouchiroud, 
2003). Searching for creative cognitive functions (cf. 
Finke, Ward & Smith, 1992) seems to be a useful way of 
conceptualizing creativity as a process rather than a personal 
trait. Specifically, we wish to identify a combination of 
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cognitive variables that can maximize the differentiation 
among young adults with high and low levels of creative 
performance. So, we start with a convergent thinking test 
(analogies), in order to address the classic controversy 
about IQ and creativity relationship. Several authors 
conclude that general intelligence, assessed with convergent 
thinking tasks, is necessary although insufficient to explain 
creative potential (Kaufman & Baer, 2002; Sternberg 
& Lubart, 1995). For example, inductive-deductive 
reasoning skills seem to be important for creative 
processes, particularly in the domain of scientific creativity 
and problem solving (Dunbar, 1995; Isaak & Just, 
1995). Analogical thinking facilitates the formulation of 
hypotheses (Clement, 1989), creation of alternatives (Isaak 
& Just, 1995), understanding of new issues as something 
familiar (Eysenck & Keane, 1990), and, consequently, 
improving insightful problem solving (Dunbar, 1995). 
Also, mental manipulation with figural contents, or imagery, 
has been closely associated with creativity because it 
facilitates the cognitive representation of a problem, faster 
or more flexible processing of information, which can be 
important for quick production of original associations 
leading to creative answers (Finke, 1997; LeBoutillier & 
Marks, 2003). 
Another important cognitive dimension of creativity 
is the divergent production of ideas, usually assumed to 
be more important to creative performance than general 
intelligence (Guilford, 1967; Runco, 1992, 2003). It is a 
kind of thinking that aims at plurality of answers, both in 
quantitative terms (fluency) and at the qualitative level 
(flexibility, originality and elaboration). But before any 
problem is solved, it must be identified and formulated. So, 
problem finding is another dimension frequently associated 
with creativity (Runco, 1994). We look at problem-finding 
as a set of cognitive skills such as making up themes, 
formulating and forecasting problems, asking questions, 
being sensitive to paradoxes, mistakes or lapses, or deducing 
a problem on the basis of its solution (Dillon, 1992; Getzels, 
1987; Jay & Perkins, 1997). Both the divergent production 
ability (in its verbal and figurative aspect) and problem 
finding skills are measured in this study. 
We also decided to explore the significance of insightful 
problem solving. It is the ability to find a solution on 
the basis of a sudden change in perceptive or cognitive 
representation of a problem situation. Insight usually 
means sudden restructuring of information, specifically 
sudden restructuring of the cognitive representation of a 
problem at hand (Davidson, 1995; Segal, 2004). Several 
models (Jones, 2003; Langley & Jones, 1988; Seifert et 
al., 1995) explain this phenomenon of restructuring with 
peculiarities of information processing, and underscore the 
role of analogical thought or simultaneous combination 
of remote pieces of information. In this study, insightful 
problem solving will be taken into account as a cognitive 
process possibly accounting for individual differences in 
the levels of creative productions. 
The main objective of this study is to find out which 
cognitive functions are more or less important for verbal 
and figurative creative productions. Another objective is 
to explore which of these cognitive functions differentiate 
more and less creative individuals. Looking for answers 
to these questions, we pay attention to the importance of 
domain-specific knowledge (Amabile, 1996; Mednick, 
1962; Simonton, 2000). Thus, we decided to investigate 
two different samples consisting of university students 
from two domains. In such a way, we should be able to 
find out whether domain-specific knowledge enters into 
any interaction with the formerly mentioned cognitive 
dimensions as a predictor of creative performance. 
Method 
Participants 
The sample consisted of 166 volunteer university 
students, 84 from the Literature and 82 from the Fine Arts 
departments. There were 128 women and 38 men in this 
sample, this proportion by and large represents gender 
disparity in the whole population of the Literature and Fine 
Arts students. Participants were recruited in the two public 
universities of northern Portugal (Porto and Minho). 
Instruments 
Insightful problem solving. An instrument that we used 
is called the Insightful Problem Solving. It was devised by 
Morais (2001) and consists of 10 verbal tasks ordered by 
their level of difficulty. Each task corresponds to a specific 
insight problem, i.e., a problem that requires restructuring 
of its cognitive representation. The representation initially 
induced by the situation must be changed in order to achieve 
the solution*1. The duration of the test is 45 minutes. The 
final score corresponds to the number of problems correctly 
answered. Concerning internal consistency measures, 
the Kuder Richardson (KR20) coefficient was 0.72. A 
confirmatory factor analysis supported a solution with one 
general factor which explains the majority of variance. 
Problem finding. This test, introduced by Morais 
(2001), consists of four verbal items. Considering one 
real and one fictitious situation, two items require putting 
questions (questions to a drop of sea water and questions 
to a man who began to see only when he was 20 years old) 
and two others require formulation of forecasting problems 
(what would happen if men could be pregnant and what 
kind of problems car drivers will have to cope with in the 
1 Example of a problem situation: Two men play five checker 
games and each wins an even number of games, with no ties. How is that 
possible? (Source: Sternberg & Davidson, 1982). Initial representation: 
try to determine combinations of games; insightful representation: the 
men didn´t play against each other. 
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next 20 years). There is a time limit of five minutes for each 
item. The scoring is based on fluency (quantity of different 
answers), and the final score is the total sum of questions 
and forecasts. Differences between contents (fictitious and 
real) and between problem finding skills (putting questions 
and forecasting problems) appeared statistically significant 
(t=4.42, df=155, p<.05, in the first case; t=21,6, df=155, 
p<.05, in the second one). Concerning internal consistency 
of items, Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was .75 and the 
judges’ agreement rate was .96. A confirmatory factorial 
analysis showed a unifactorial model as adjusted to explain 
the results on four items. 
Figurative and verbal reasoning. This is a test of 
convergent problem solving skills, specifically deductive 
and inductive reasoning, devised by Ribeiro and Almeida 
(1993). Both figurative and verbal subtests comprise 
25 items, ordered by their difficulty level. Each item 
corresponds to an analogy (between abstract designs and 
between words) and the participant is supposed to choose 
an answer from among five alternatives. The figurative test 
lasts 10 minutes and the verbal one lasts 5 minutes. The 
final score of each subtest is the number of items/analogies 
correctly answered. 
Concerning internal consistency of items, the Kuder 
Richardson (KR20) coefficient was .82 and .83 in respect 
to verbal and figurative tests. 
Figurative and verbal divergent thinking. This 
instrument, introduced by Ribeiro and Almeida (1993), 
consists of two figurative and two verbal items. A participant 
has three minutes for each item. In the figurative subtest, 
a participant should create figures from given figurative 
elements, and at the end of each production he or she should 
give a title and identify the elements used. In the verbal 
subtest, a participant should write sentences using four 
words given in a specific order. These sentences should be 
meaningful. The score of each answer varies between 0 and 
3 points depending on its quality. Answers which repeat 
parts of a previous task are not taken into account. This 
scoring system includes criteria of quantity (the number 
of pertinent answers), diversity (similar answers are 
excluded), and originality (higher values are given to less 
frequent productions). The judges’ agreement rates were 
.94 and .93 in respect to verbal and figurative tests. 
Creative products. Participants were invited to produce 
a text and a poster. As to the texts, they were requested to 
write an essay that could be read at a scientific conference 
about “Animals in captivity and the future”. It should 
have been in prose and not surpass one sheet of paper. The 
duration of this task was 40 minutes. As to the production 
of posters, the theme was “Environmental pollution and the 
future”. The posters should be made in pencil on one sheet 
of paper. Students were requested to prepare their posters 
for a fictitious scientific conference on environmental 
pollution. The duration of the task was 35 minutes. Both 
productions were assessed on a scale of 9 levels (from 1 to 
5 with intervals of 5 points) independently by three experts 
(Portuguese Language and Art teachers for the texts and 
the posters, respectively). The criterion for this assessment 
was the subjective perception of creativity of the product 
(Amabile, 1983). The judges’ agreement rates were .76 and 
.74 in respect to texts and posters. 
Procedure 
First, the main objectives of the study were explained 
to the participants. Then, confidentiality of their results 
was assured. They were also promised to obtain feedback 
in writing. Test administration occurred during classes with 
teachers´ permission. The instruments were administered in 
the following order: text production and insight problems 
(first session), poster production, problem-finding, 
figurative and verbal reasoning, figurative and verbal 
divergent thinking (second session) 
Results 
Table 1 presents means, standard deviations, minima 
and maxima of all variables that were measured in this 
study. These data are also split into two subgroups. Several 
differences between both groups appeared statistically 
Table 1
Descriptive statistics on variables by both groups and global sample.
Variables 
Global sample (n=166) Fine Arts (n=82) Humanities (n=84) 
Mean SD Range Mean SD Range Mean SD Range
Insight 4.7 2.16 0-8 5.2 2.01 1-8 4.1 2.18 0-8
Problem-finding 28.8 8.03 10-55 27.4 7.96 10-47 30.0 7.94 15-55
 Figural reasoning 10.0 3.58 1-18 11.3 3.03 4-18 8.7 3.60 1-17
Verbal reasoning 12.5 3.58 3-24 12.4 4.39 3-24 12.5 3.49 6-22
Figural divergent thinking 9.7 4.88 1-26 12.4 4.81 2-26 7.2 3.35 1-17
Verbal divergent thinking 11.8 5.04 0-25 12.1 5.29 2-25 11.5 4.81 0-25
Texts 3.0 0.75 2-5 3.2 0.81 2-5 2.8 0.66 2-5
Posters                   3.0 0.80 2-5 3.5 0.72 2-5 2.5 0.41 2-4
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significant (see bold and italic values on table). Fine 
Arts students scored better on Insight (t=2.24; df=161; 
p<.05), Figural reasoning (t=4.83; df=144; p<.05), Figural 
divergent thinking (t=7.55; df=144; p<.05), Posters 
(t=10.62; df=147; p<.05) and Texts (t=3.26; df=153; p<.05). 
Humanities students obtained higher scores on Problem-
finding (t=2.10; df=154; p<.05). No difference was found 
on Verbal reasoning. These results suggest generally better 
performance on cognitive tests and creative productions 
by Fine Arts students, although these differences are less 
salient concerning verbal scales. 
Discriminant analysis was carried out in order to identify 
combinations of cognitive variables that maximize the 
distinction between extreme levels of creative performance. 
In taking such an approach, we aimed at understanding what 
characterizes high performance on the different creative 
tasks, that is, Texts and Posters. Discriminant groups (i.e., 
individuals assessed as non-creative and very creative) 
were analyzed in reference to both tasks. The statistical 
coefficients inherent to the discriminant analysis, as well 
as the respective levels of significance, the structural 
canonical coefficients of each variable, and the percent of 
cases correctly classified in both groups, were calculated. 
Considering the scores on Posters, the values obtained 
were: Wilkes’s Lambda =.811; Canonical correlation (Rc) 
=.434; Chi-square (6) =15.681; p=.016. The percentage 
of subjects correctly classified was 69%. Considering the 
scores on Texts production, the statistics were as follows: 
Wilkes’s Lambda =.853; Canonical correlation (Rc) 
=.383; Chi-square (6) =13.466; p=0.36. The percentage 
of individuals correctly classified was 66%. The structural 
canonical coefficients for both tasks of creative productions 
are presented in Table 2. 
Taking into account both kinds of creative performance, 
we can identify cognitive variables that differentiate 
extreme groups of creative performers. Considering that 
coefficients at the level of .30 or higher should be taken 
for such differentiation (Huberty & Morris, 1989), we can 
observe that the only difference between the two types 
of creative accomplishment refers to the negative value 
contribution of verbal reasoning to poster productions. It 
seems quite clear that both creative tasks need very similar 
cognitive processes to be accomplished at a high level 
of performance. In other words, similarities rather than 
differences have been observed concerning the cognitive 
prerequisites needed for accomplishment of two types of 
creative tasks. We can see that, in both cases, the main 
variables are Figurative reasoning, Figurative divergent 
thinking and Insight problem solving. Problem finding has 
an acceptable limit value, too. Verbal divergent thinking does 
not contribute to differentiation between extreme groups of 
creative performers. In the discriminations obtained, there 
is an apparent error of about 30%. However, such a result 
must be expected by the fact that creative performance 
was predicted only by a few cognitive factors. Knowing 
that creativity is a broad and multifaceted concept, it 
seems to be an acceptable result to assure 70% of correct 
replacements. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The results of this study suggest that there are a number 
of cognitive variables that matter as predictors of creative 
performance: reasoning ability, divergent thinking ability, 
insight problem solving ability, and problem finding ability. 
Since the reasoning ability is close to traditionally defined 
intelligence, we have to conclude that a high level of 
creative performance needs first of all general intelligence, 
which must be balanced by purely creative skills, such 
as divergent thinking, insight problem solving, and 
problem finding. However, only the figurative versions of 
reasoning and divergent thinking tests appeared important 
as instruments that allowed discrimination between high 
and low levels of creative performance. Verbal versions of 
theses tests did not contribute at all, or —in the case of 
verbal reasoning — brought about the opposite pattern of 
relationships. Since we did not apply nonverbal versions 
of insight and problem finding tests, we cannot decide 
whether this pattern of relationship reflects some general 
rule, according to which only figurative measurement 
instruments are able to provide valid discriminations 
between various levels of creative performance. Finally, 
we have to underscore that the instruments we used did not 
allow us to identify any differences between two separate 
types of creative productions. Both Posters and Texts 
obtained a rather similar coefficient (see Table 2), which 
means that cognitive requirements of a creative work are 
quite similar regardless of the type of tasks. How can such 
findings be explained? 
First, let us point out that levels of intelligence slightly 
above the average (IQ between 110 and 120) is viewed as 
one of the necessary conditions of creativity; therefore, weak 
creative performance is generally associated with low levels 
of intelligence (Walberg, 1988). However, intelligence 
usually appears as a necessary but not sufficient condition 
of creativity (Kaufman & Baer, 2002; Sternberg & Lubart, 
1995). Our results suggest that creative performance needs 
Posters Texts
Figurative reasoning  .544  .581 
Figurative divergent thinking  .530       .538 
Insight  .440       .448 
Verbal reasoning -.337     .033 
Problem finding  .308  .297 
Verbal divergent thinking  .077 -.033 
Table 2
Structural canonical coefficients for Posters and Texts. 
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both convergent and divergent thinking skills. Many authors 
(e.g., Kaufman & Baer, 2004) emphasize the combination 
of both types of skills, or two types of cognitive styles, in 
creativity. It seems that, in this study, the difference between 
excellent and poor creative performance may be related 
to differences in one’s ability to manage the process of 
production of alternative ideas, in one’s logical and critical 
selection of goals, and in one’s evaluation skills. All these 
skills are covered by the notion of general intelligence. So, 
it seems entirely explicable why the figurative reasoning 
test appeared so important in this study. The only problem 
refers to the question of why it appeared to be the most 
important factor differentiating students who showed high 
and low creative performance. We believe that this question 
must be open for further research. 
Now, let us discuss the question of why only the figurative 
versions of our measurement instruments appeared good 
discriminators between more and less creative students. It 
seems reasonable to point out that figurative reasoning tests 
imply not only the ability to think in abstraction but also, to 
some extent, the imagery skills (Finke, 1997; LeBoutillier 
& Marks, 2003). In other words, the instrument we applied 
probably covered more than one domain of cognitive 
performance. For instance, the figurative reasoning test 
measured not only general intelligence but also imagery. 
The figurative test of divergent production measured not 
only the production of a variety of ideas but also imagery. 
And it is quite well-established that the figurative channel 
of information processing is relevant to creative thinking. 
The quantity and diversity of information allowed for 
processing through the imagery system (e.g., flexibility 
of focusing on global or local aspects of information) 
increase the probability of remote associations that are 
vital for creative behavior (Mednick, 1962). Maybe, if 
only the verbal versions were applied, they would appear 
important predictors of creative performance because of 
their involvement in reasoning and divergent production. 
However, these verbal versions probably lost their 
predictive power while being accompanied by figurative 
versions which, apart from their involvement in reasoning 
and divergent production, were also associated with the 
domains of imagery and figurative thinking.
 The significance of imagery for creative productions 
can also be illustrated by the fact that the verbal reasoning 
test showed its negative value in the case of posters 
production, meaning that authors of creative posters 
obtained low scores in this test, and vice-versa. Apparently, 
we have to agree with Runco and Albert (1991) that verbal 
processing of information results in lower level of novelty 
in one’s intellectual productions. Moreover, the verbal 
reasoning test probably required some amount of linguistic 
knowledge, particularly in the case of items that were 
based on such relations as similarity or opposition between 
concepts. If so, the vocabulary span could be important in 
this instrument, and the negative role of verbal reasoning in 
the creation of posters appears quite explicable. 
Insight and problem finding skills appeared less 
important, although they were identified as necessary 
for the distinction between participants who produced 
more and less creative outputs. In our opinion, such 
contribution cannot be perceived separately from other 
variables. Insightful problem solving appeals to multiple 
characteristics of cognitive processing (Langley & Jones, 
1988; Seifert et al, 1995), which are not independent 
of intelligence (Davidson, 1995),divergent production 
(Smilansky & Halberstadt, 1986) or imagery (Blakeslee, 
1980). The instruments that were adopted in this study 
were selected on the basis of dominant type of cognitive 
processing; however, they were not pure enough to exclude 
other types of processing. Contamination of cognitive tests 
with influences from the skills and processes that were not 
supposed to be measured seems inevitable. Even the most 
popular tests of cognitive performance, such as Raven’s 
Progressive Matrices (Raven, Court & Raven, 1983) are not 
pure measures of general intelligence because apparently 
they are subjected to contamination with other skills, e.g., 
spatial orientation (cf. Hunt, 1974). 
Now, we can reflect why both sets of differentiating 
variables, as well as the magnitude of their respective 
structural canonical coefficients, appeared quite similar 
in the case of figural and verbal creative productions. We 
expect rather opposite patterns of results because research 
on creativity demonstrates the relevance of domain 
specificity: correlations coefficient between quality of 
creative products coming form different domains are usually 
not so high (Baer, 1993; Sternberg & Lubart, 1995). On the 
other hand, there seem to exist some nuclear, or elementary, 
cognitive skills, e.g., remote associations of ideas (Gruszka 
& Necka, 2002; Martindale, 1999; Mednick, 1962) that are 
necessary for every creative activity and therefore occur 
across different domains. Our results clearly suggest that 
generality rather than domain specificity should be regarded 
as a rule of creativity. However, one must realize that the 
criteria used to assess creative productions did not include 
any academic knowledge because only the general idea 
was taken into account. This fact certainly has contributed 
to a finding that quite similar sets of variables appeared 
significant, regardless of the domain involved. Future 
research should therefore include creative tasks that would 
be rather unfamiliar to different groups of participants. In 
this way, the role of transfer in creative problem solving may 
be analyzed, as well as the question of domain specificity 
concerning creative thought. 
In any case, this effect of similarity concerning two 
groups of participants can also be interpreted in terms of 
relevance, or irrelevance, of academic background for the 
quality of creative productions. We found that there were 
very good and very weak creators among both Fine Arts 
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and Humanities subgroups, although the nature of at least 
one task should put the Fine Arts students in the privileged 
position. Does it mean that our university courses do not 
cover skills that are important for creative imagination, 
even if some of them should apparently lead to increased 
levels of creative skills? It may well be that Fine Arts 
students are taught techniques of drawing or painting 
but not creativity. We believe that creativity can be, and 
should be, taught through university courses, although this 
problem probably could not win enough attention from the 
persons and institutions that are responsible for curricula 
development. 
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